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WHY BLACK HOMEOWNERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE CARIBBEAN-
AMERICAN THAN AFRICAN AMERICAN IN NEW YORK: A THEORY OF HOW 
EARLY WEST INDIAN MIGRANTS BROKE RACIAL CARTELS IN HOUSING  
ELEANOR MARIE LAWRENCE BROWN* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why are the black brownstone owners in Harlem and Brooklyn 
disproportionately West Indian? The landlords, West Indian-American? The 
tenants African-American?  These are tough questions. For students of 
housing discrimination, West Indian Americans have long presented a 
quandary. If it is reasonable to assume that racial exclusions are being 
consistently applied to persons who are dark-skinned, one would expect to 
find that housing discrimination has had similar effects on West Indian-
Americans and African-Americans. Yet this is not the case: West Indian-
Americans generally own and rent higher quality housing than African-
Americans.   
 
Moreover, these advantages began long ago. For example, when racial 
covenants, that is, restrictions barring racial and ethnic groups from owning 
real property in particular neighborhoods were rife in New York, they were 
not consistently applied against West Indians, who were sometimes able to 
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buy into tony neighborhoods.  While it is true that such covenants were also 
inconsistently applied against other ethnic and religious groups such as 
Jewish New Yorkers, West-Indians still stand out.  Since West Indians are 
overwhelmingly dark-skinned persons of African descent they typically did 
not have the option of “passing” that may have been available to other 
groups.  
 
Eschewing more traditional explanations in the civil rights literature, I apply 
the literature in which racial segregation in real property ownership is 
conceived as a racial monopoly in which racial cartels appropriate anti-
competitive techniques to monopolize access to real property. Maintaining 
a racial cartel is dependent on white owners maintaining a united front, that 
is, they must uniformly refuse to sell. Importantly, realtors play a 
gatekeeping role in real estate and West Indians dominated the realtor 
sector. As realtors, they were expert at finding defectors, namely, whites 
willing to break norms of racial exclusivity, in exchange for their ability to 
extract a premium for selling to blacks early.  Brokers then proceeded to buy 
significant numbers of titles, which were then off-loaded to fellow West 
Indians.  West Indian brokers could act in confidence because they had cash-
rich clients and were often buying in trust (de-facto if not de-jure) for fellow 
West Indians.  
 
In so doing, West Indian brokers in New York were simply replicating 
techniques that had been utilized by their land-brokering ancestors. I discuss 
the history that “previews” this period in New York, albeit in a different 
context: in the British West Indian islands from the migrants originated. 
There are repeated instances of blacks "busting" white monopolies in land-
ownership, throughout the West Indian colonies in contravention of racial 
norms in the British colonies of who was allowed to own land where.  Upon 
arrival in New York, West Indians encountered another racial monopoly in 
real property ownership, namely Northern racial segregation. They 
essentially appropriated the same techniques that they had utilized in the 
West Indies to break into white neighbourhoods in New York.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why are the black brownstone owners in Harlem and Brooklyn 
disproportionately West Indian? 1  The landlords, West Indian-American? 
The tenants African-American? 2 These are tough questions.3 For students of 
                                                     
1 RONALD SCHMIDT SR., ET AL., NEWCOMERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INSIDERS:  IMMIGRANTS 
AND AMERICAN RACIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111 (2009); Kyle D. 
Crowder, Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan Area: 
The Role of Race and Ethnicity, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 79 (1999); see also EMILY ROSENBAUM 
& SAMANTHA FRIEDMAN, THE HOUSING DIVIDE:  HOW GENERATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS FARE IN 
NEW YORK’S HOUSING MARKET (2007). 
2 Of course, there is a long and fraught history of discrimination against African Americans in real-
property ownership both in the post-bellum South and in the North after the Great Migration. Some 
relevant articles in the legal scholarship are summarized in Footnote 111, infra.  For articles 
discussing comparative housing patterns between West Indians and African Americans, see Kyle 
D. Crowder & Lucky Tedrow, West Indians and the Residential Landscape of New York City,  in 
ISLANDS IN THE CITY: WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO NEW YORK (Nancy Foner ed., 2001); Arun 
Peter Lobo & Joseph J. Salvo, The Newest New Yorkers, 2000: Immigrant New York in the New 
Millenium, 1999; ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, PHILIP KASINITZ, CARIBBEAN NEW 
YORK: BLACK IMMIGRANTS AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 90-95 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
1992), PAULE MARSHALL, BROWN GIRL, BROWNSTONES (1981).  
3  There is a significant background literature on West Indian success, with several sources 
discussing the property markets. See, e.g., Winston James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social 
Mobility in the United States: Beyond the Sowell Thesis, 44 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 218 
(2002) [hereinafter James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; see also Winston James, 
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housing discrimination, West Indian Americans have long presented a 
quandary.4 West Indians, like African Americans, are overwhelmingly dark 
skinned persons of African descent who were enslaved (albeit in the West 
Indies rather than the United Sates) and are phenotypically indistinguishable 
from African-Americans.
5  Thus, if it is reasonable to assume that racial 
exclusions are being consistently applied to persons who are dark-skinned, 
one would expect to find that housing discrimination has had similar effects 
                                                     
New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in New York City, A Critique of the Sowell Thesis, 
in NEW CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: A READER (Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
James, New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; IRA DE A. REID, THE NEGRO IMMIGRANT: 
HIS BACKGROUND, CHARACTERISTICS, AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT, 1899-1937 (Arno Press 1969)  
(1939); NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1970); 
ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE (Nathan Glazer & Daniel Patrick Moynihan eds., 1975). 
4 ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 121. 
5
 I will regularly refer to two groups of Blacks. The first group, African Americans (often pithily 
referred to in the literature as “native” Blacks), includes those descended from Africans who were 
enslaved here in the United States. The second group, West Indians, has a different historical 
heritage. These are persons who were enslaved in the West Indies but were not enslaved in the 
United States and who later became migrants to the United States, mostly after the abolition of 
slavery in the United States. The term “West Indians” as utilized in this Article does not generally 
include West Indian immigrants to the United States of other ethnic backgrounds. See Calvin B. 
Holder, West Indies: Antigua, Bahamas Barbados, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, St. 
Kitts, Trinidad, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE 1965, at 674-75 (Mary 
C. Waters & Reed Ueda eds., 2007 (describing the migration of West Indians to the United States 
and identifying the group as racially diverse, but predominantly Black). In this Essay, I utilize the 
term “black” West Indian—as opposed to Afro-West Indian or African-West Indian.  In this 
context, the term “black” West Indian refers only to West Indians of African descent and does not 
include, for example, West Indians who belong to other racial minority groups, such as persons of 
East Indian heritage were sometimes referred to as “black” in the United Kingdom (to whom the 
West Indian colonies largely belonged at the time). Winston James has a comprehensive statistical 
summary of pre-1965 black immigration to the U.S. by region of origin. Early black immigrants 
were overwhelmingly of Caribbean origin.  Prior to World War II, blacks known as “British West 
Indians” appeared to outnumber all other black migrant groups by a large margin, with Jamaica, 
the most populated British West Indian island, supplying the largest number of immigrants.  I use 
the term “ British West Indies,” “West Indies” or “West India” in the sense in which it is typically 
used in the historical literature, namely to refer to the Caribbean islands in the Greater and Lesser 
Antilles. These include Antigua and Barbuda (which were governed by the British as a political 
unit), St. Kitts and Nevis (same), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (same), Trinidad and Tobago 
(same), Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, and Guyana.Indeed, Jamaicans have 
been the largest group of black Caribbean immigrants for some time,  only recently being overtaken 
by Nigerians. See, James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility, supra note 3.  
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on West Indians6 and African-Americans.7 As one author notes, “levels of 
segregation suggest that the housing and neighborhood characteristics of 
African Americans and West Indians should be indecipherable.”8   
 Yet, this is not the case.  West Indian neighborhoods are 
distinguishable from African American neighborhoods. Take, for example, 
indices of segregation. West Indians occupy neighborhoods with lower 
indices of segregation than African Americans.9  West Indians also occupy 
better quality rentals and own better quality homes than African 
Americans.10   
These statistical patterns are less surprising where West Indian 
households earn more than African American householders.11 In a Harpers 
cover story, James Traub noted that West Indians seemed to place significant 
value not only on home ownership, but indeed on owning many homes.12 He 
interviewed West Indians of apparently modest means, who had worked 
multiple jobs, to acquire multiple homes.13 For example, one blue-collar 
couple had acquired an apartment building; the rental income was then used 
to acquire further buildings.14 West Indian success patterns merited a front-
page story in the New York Times.15 When the finding that black per-capita 
income in certain sections of Queens, New York exceeded white per-capita 
income elicited nationwide news coverage, sociologists in-the-know 
recognized that the blacks in question were home-owning middle-class West 
Indians.16 
                                                     
6  I utilize the definition of West Indians that is conventionally used in the sociological literature, 
namely, Anglophone (formerly British-colonized) Caribbean nationals. The migrants were 
overwhelmingly descendants of slaves and “coloreds.” The sociologist-historian Orlando Patterson 
provides a summary of the significance of the West Indies from which the migrants originated and 
its social structure as follows:  
“The sugar plantations, which became all-important by the turn of the eighteenth century, 
made the Afro-Caribbean societies the richest areas of the world.  They also set the basic social 
structure and tone of these societies.  African slaves were brought in on a large scale, resulting in 
the early demographic dominance of black people.  Ruling them was a small minority of white 
planters . . . Between masters and slaves a third group soon emerged—the coloreds or people of 
mixed ancestry.  This group formed a useful racial and socio-cultural buffer between the whites 
and blacks.  By the end of the eighteenth century a substantial number of them were freedmen.” 
See Orlando Patterson, Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and 
Caribbean Case Study, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 3 [hereinafter 
Patterson, Ethnic Allegiance]. 
7 ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 118. 
8 Id. at 121. 
9 Id. at 119. 
10 Id. at 121. 
11 Id. at 118.  
12 James Traub, You Can Get It If You Really Want, HARPER’S, June 1982.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 See Sam Roberts, In Middle-Class Queens, Blacks Pass Whites in Household Income, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/06/nyregion/in-middle-class-queens-
blacks-pass-whites-in-household-income.html; see also Sam Roberts, Blacks Incomes Surpass 
Whites in Queens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/nyregion/01census.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
16 Rosenbaum and Friedman, supra note 1.  
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But even when researchers control for income, the West Indian 
advantage in housing stock appears to persist.17 Thus, there may be other 
factors at play. For example, one sociological study contends that “the 
tendency of West Indian households to occupy better quality housing and 
neighborhoods than African Americans directly results from their relative 
concentration in formerly middle-class white neighborhoods that had stocks 
of owner-occupied homes.18 That is, West Indians were more likely to buy 
into “solid” white neighborhoods. Moreover, West Indians have long 
dominated the black realtor sector.19 Given the "gatekeeper" role played by 
realtors, one cannot help wondering whether West Indians have had 
advantages in mitigating the effect of housing discrimination that have 
typically not been available to African Americans. 20  
There are good reasons for this suspicion, although the evidence is 
largely anecdotal. In the article that arguably launched Malcolm Gladwell’s 
career, he reflects on the employment trajectory of his Jamaican co-ethnics 
shortly after their arrival from the West Indies in 1920 New York.21 Like 
many immigrants of the time, many sought jobs in garment factories. 22 
These garment factories were typically segregated; moreover, the 
segregation was deeply institutionalized as evidenced by the existence of 
separate unions for black and white garment workers.23  Yet, Gladwell’s 
West Indian subjects sought and received jobs in factories where signs were 
posted stating “Negroes need not apply,” despite being recognizably dark-
skinned persons of African descent.24  
Indeed, West Indians were able to get jobs in several lines of work 
that had previously either been reserved for “whites only” or had been 
segregated – including porters, elevator operators, nursing aides and so 
                                                     
17 Id.  
18  Id. at 121 (describing the concentration of West Indians in formerly White middle-class 
neighborhoods). 
19  IRMA WATKINS-OWENS, BLOOD RELATIONS: CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE HARLEM 
COMMUNITY, 1900–1930, at 46  (1996) (discussing the heavy representation of West Indians 
among black realtors).  
20 See VILNA FRANCINE BASHI, SURVIVAL OF THE KNITTED: IMMIGRANT SOCIAL NETWORKS IN A 
STRATIFIED WORLD 182-206 (2007).   
21 Malcolm Gladwell, Black Like Them, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 1996, at 74, 78. ). Gladwell also 
discusses long-standing tensions between African Americans and his Jamaican co-ethnics (borne 
partly from differential treatment by employers.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.; see also LEIGH DAVID BENIN, THE NEW LABOR RADICALISM AND NEW YORK CITY’S 
GARMENT INDUSTRY: PROGRESSIVE LABOR INSURGENTS IN THE 1960S (Stuart Bruchey, ed. 
2000); Herbert Hill, The Untold Story, THE CRISIS (November 1962); Robert Laurentz, 
Racial/Ethnic Conflict in New York City Garment Industry 1933-1980 (Ph. D. dissertation, State 
University of New York at Binghampton 1980). 
24 Id., This point is made by prominent Harlem Renaissance intellectual, W.A. Domingo in W.A. 
Domingo, The Tropics in New York, SURVEY GRAPHIC, Mar. 1925, at 648, 649 available at 
http://www.unz.org/Pub/TheSurvey-1925mar01;  W. A. Domingo, Gift of the Black Tropics, in 
ALAIN LOCKE, ED., THE NEW NEGRO: AN INTERPRETATION (1925)). See also Dennis Forsythe, 
Black Immigrants and the American Ethos: Theories and Observations, in CARIBBEAN 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 55, 65–66 (Roy S. Bryce Laporte & Delores M. Mortimer 
eds., 1983) (same). 
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forth.25 Thus one might say that West Indians were at the forefront of the de-
facto (if not de jure) “integration” of the workplace in 1920s New York, long 
before comprehensive legislation existed to preclude racial discrimination in 
employment.26   
This is a book about property and yet I have begun with a narrative 
about work. Why? There are significant analogies between West Indian 
trajectories of upward advancement in both areas.  To understand the 
analogies one might consider Richard Brooks and Carol Rose’s book Saving 
the Neighborhood. 27  It tracks the trajectory and persistence of racially 
restrictive covenants, that is, restrictions barring racial and ethnic groups 
from owning real property in particular neighborhoods. Such covenants were 
applied with particular force against certain racial, ethnic and religious 
groups in the pre-civil rights era.28  Drawing on the law and social norms 
literature, their thesis is that the persistence of these covenants even after 
their enforcement was outlawed by the Supreme Court was less about their 
enforceability than about their value in “signalling” norms of racial 
exclusivity.29  
The connection between Brooks and Rose’s narrative and 
Gladwell’s Jamaican garment workers is implicit. A workplace sign saying 
“Negroes need not apply,” is the employment equivalent of a racially 
restrictive covenant. If we argue by analogy to Brooks and Rose, these 
workplace signs have a signalling value in employment, just as racially 
restrictive covenants do in property.  The narratives of 1920s West Indian 
New Yorkers indicate that while racial discrimination was rife with the 
accompanied signalling (“Negroes need not apply; this property may not be 
sold to Negroes”), these exclusions were not being consistently applied to 
West Indians in both the domains of employment and property. The question 
becomes what was so special about West Indians?  
In this Essay, I offer an entirely new narrative that is outside the 
traditional civil rights discourse. The traditional comparative approach to the 
study of the effects of institutional barriers to housing would entail the 
following steps. First, comparative scholars consider two groups of people 
who are ostensibly similar (namely, African Americans and West Indians, 
both groups being "black"). Second, they observe different outcomes 
(namely, West Indians occupying better housing than African Americans). 
                                                     
25 This point is made by references in the previous footnote. 
26 One might also see the work of Winston James, on the black radicals of the Harlem Renaissance 
who were disproportionately West Indian. Many of these radicals were involved in the labor 
struggles of early 20th Century New York City.  See generally, Chapters 5 and 6 of WINSTON 
JAMES, HOLDING ALOFT THE BATTLE OF ETHIOPIA: CARIBBEAN RADICALISM IN EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1998). Chapter 5 of JOYCE MOORE TURNER, CARIBBEAN 
CRUSADERS AND THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE (2005) is also helpful. The most comprehensive 
treatment is actually BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2002). Chapter 2 is particularly helpful. 
27  RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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Third, they consider how discriminatory frameworks operate differently with 
respect to the two groups of people.  
This Essay takes a different approach. In fact, it is unclear to me that 
West Indians are necessarily an appropriate comparative group. In Part I, in 
a brief background to the larger argument, I address a few of the theories that 
have been prominent in the civil rights literature. These theories might be 
classified in the tradition of the prominent sociologist Goffman as 
“performative.” 30 The central idea that performative theories share is that 
particular groups (in this case, West Indians) are better at “performing” so as 
to assuage stereotypical (white) fears (about blacks), and these 
“performances” have tangible benefits in several arenas including housing.31  
In Part II, I transition to my alternative argument. I note that in the 
early decades of the 20th Century when West Indians started arriving in New 
York, homeowners were almost entirely white elites. Blacks (although their 
numbers were miniscule) and poorer whites were essentially excluded from 
home-ownership. Relying on the work of other scholars, I note that racial 
segregation in real property ownership (and the associated racial covenants) 
may be conceived as a racial monopoly in which racial cartels appropriate 
anti-competitive techniques to monopolize access to real property.32 
In Part II, I also note that maintaining racial exclusivity in certain 
neighborhoods was dependent on white owners maintaining a united front, 
that is, they must uniformly refuse to sell.33 West Indian realtors were expert 
at finding defectors, namely, whites willing to break norms of racial 
exclusivity, in exchange for their ability to extract a premium for selling to 
blacks early.  Thus, West Indian brokers then proceeded to buy significant 
numbers of titles, which were then off-loaded to fellow West Indians.  West 
Indian realtors could act in confidence because they were often buying in 
trust (de-facto if not de-jure) for fellow West Indians.34  I also note that 
arguably West Indian realtors were engaged in "blockbusting."35 Decades 
later, during the civil rights era, blockbusting gained notoriety as the 
deliberate promotion of “racial tipping” in previously all-white or integrated 
neighborhoods for speedy transition to black neighborhoods by realtors and 
other real estate players seeking quick financial gain.36 I contend that early 
West Indian realtors, appropriated techniques that arguably approximated 
blockbusting and preceded their mid-century peers by decades.37 
                                                     
30  Theories of “passing” and “covering” are peformative theories. The oft-cited definition of 
covering comes from Erving Goffman’s classic, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
SPOILED IDENTITY (1986) namely trying to rendering a characteristic invisible. The term has been 
more recently popularized again in Kenji Yoshino’s COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
31 See infra Part I.  
32 Id.  
33 See infra Part II. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 See infra Part I. 
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In Part III, I transition to the history that “previews” this period in 
New York in the British West Indian islands from which West Indian 
migrants originate.38 I note that there are repeated instances of West Indians 
"busting" white monopolies in land-ownership, throughout the West Indian 
colonies in contravention of racial norms in the British colonies of who was 
allowed to own land where.  Upon arrival in New York, West Indians 
encountered another (albeit different) racial monopoly in real property 
ownership, namely Northern racial segregation. They essentially 
appropriated the same techniques that they had utilized in the West Indies to 
break into white neighbourhoods.39 
In Part III, I also apply Hirschman's classic framework of "voice," 
"exit," and "loyalty." I note that in the aftermath of Emancipation in the 
British West Indies, when given a "choice" to remain on sugar plantations 
(in sharecropping relationships that many West Indian freedmen believed too 
closely approximated slavery), freedmen overwhelmingly chose "exit." But 
West Indian freedmen were able to exit only because they had land to exit 
to.  At this point, I re-introduce the thesis on busting racial monopolies. West 
Indian land ownership was facilitated in part by white “defectors,” that is, 
white land-owners who deviated from norms of racial exclusivity and 
“cashed out” by selling their plantations to black people.  
West Indian blacks were not passive players in this process. Several 
plantation owners were “converted” by a savvy black land-brokering class, 
who created reserves of cash for land purchase by pooling the resources of 
their clients. That is, land brokers acted as trustees of cash deposits for 
multiple prospective purchasers, while cultivating cash-strapped members of 
the plantocracy. When planters were ready to sell, they pounced and paid 
cash up-front.   
In Conclusion, I note that there are also traces (but only traces) of 
the legal transplant literature. This historical practice of activity in the land 
markets in the West Indies has long-term legal consequences in the United 
States. This is an unconventional legal transplant argument as I have no 
formal law to substantiate the argument.   
But rules matter, even if they are only norms and not embodied in 
formal law. The efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in 
their islands of origin was undergirded by a set of rules, namely rules that 
solved collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in 
trust on behalf of other West Indians. These rules also protected future land-
owners from unscrupulous trustees. Brokers had significant opportunities for 
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their 
fellow West Indians because such behavior would have entailed communal 
expulsion. Similar patterns are replicated when they arrived in New York 
City.  
Admittedly, the legal-transplant literature is not a perfect fit. For 
example, that there is not much in the way of "law," namely, state-backed 
                                                     
38 See infra Part III. 
39 Id. 
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rules, that were formally transplanted from the West Indian context to New 
York. Nevertheless, West Indians brought with them a robust set of norms 
which governed how they operated in housing and land markets. One might 
think of West Indians as comparable to diaspora ethnic minorities such as 
the Chinese in Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, or the Maghribi Jews in 
the "Muslim West" who traded across borders with informal rules in complex 
capital markets long before the development of formal commercial law, 
either domestically or transnationally.  
 
I. PERFORMATIVE THEORIES 
 
The narratives of 1920s West Indian New Yorkers indicate that while 
racial discrimination was rife with the accompanied signalling (“Negroes 
need not apply; this property may not be sold to Negroes”), these exclusions 
were not being consistently applied to West Indians in both the domains of 
employment and property.40 Take, for example, sections of upscale Harlem 
that were understood to be “all white.”41 Much to the surprise of leading 
journalistic observers, moderately affluent West Indians were permitted to 
live alongside whites, albeit in small numbers.42   
This occurred even as the exclusions, and particularly racial covenants, 
were legally enforceable; indeed, racially restrictive covenants were 
widespread in Harlem at the time.43 At least with respect to these quasi-
affluent West Indians, racially restrictive covenants appear to have been 
sometimes ignored.44 What was so special about West Indians? 
There are a number of factors that might account for this disparate (and 
advantageous) treatment of West Indians in relation to other blacks. Indeed, 
a skeptical reader might wonder: why is this phenomenon so special?   
Notably, West Indians were not atypical in this respect. For example, 
another group that was often the target of racially restrictive covenants was 
Jews.45   Yet Jews were often purchasing property even when covenants 
clearly stated that property may not be sold to members of the “Hebrew 
race.”46  
Racial covenants which purported to constrain purchases by members of 
the “Hebrew race” were widespread well beyond the 1950s.47 Indeed it is 
clear that discrimination more generally against persons of Jewish heritage 
                                                     
40 See infra Part II. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Kevin Fox Gotham, Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial Residential 
Segregation in a US City, 1900-50, 24.3 INT’L J. OF URB. & REG’L RESEARCH (2000), available at 
http://tulane.edu/liberal-arts/upload/RestrCovenants.pdf ; GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE 
MAKING OF A GHETTO: NEGRO NEW YORK 1890-1930 (1971).  
44 See infra Part II.  
45 BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 27.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
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was still rife (in employment, schooling and property markets, for 
example).48 Yet, simultaneously there is evidence that many early Jewish 
families overcame these barriers.  
Jews who bought properties in spite of discriminatory covenants 
essentially did so by what Dershowitz would deem “passing.” Dershowitz is 
critical of those who mask their underlying Jewish identity, particularly 
Jewish migrants and their descendants in the United States, which he deems 
to be the most favourable environment in which Jews have settled as a 
minority (leaving Israel aside, where Jews constitute a majority).49 However, 
it seems unfair to label a failure to mention religious heritage when 
conducting property-related transactions as “passing,” since religious 
heritage could hardly be relevant to property transactions. Why mention 
what is not relevant? 
Irrespective of what one thinks of “passing,” the typical West Indian 
conducting a property-related transaction (in contravention of a racial 
covenant), would have been different than someone of Jewish heritage 
conducting a similar transaction (again, in contravention of a discriminatory 
covenant.) Typically, these West Indians were not “passing.”50  Notably, 
many of these West Indians (even affluent ones) had no such “opt-out” 
option. Most West Indians were clearly phenotypically black51 and as such 
were clearly “outsiders.” That is, as blacks, West Indians were clearly among 
the targets for whom the aforementioned Brooks/Rose “signals” were 
intended. 
Although “passing” may not explain the West Indian presence in white 
neighbourhoods, Yoshino’s work in the gay civil rights scholarship, reminds 
us that “passing” has a close cousin, namely, “covering.”52  That is, even if 
West Indians did not have the option of passing (i.e. masking their 
                                                     
48 Id. 
49 Here, I depend on Kenji Yoshino's distinction between passing and covering. Kenji Yoshino has 
popularized the word "covering." See Yoshino, supra note 30; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE 
L.J. 769 (2002). While "covering" is a complex concept, a more indelicate term for "covering" (at 
least as used in this context) is "passing." That is, Jewish families would fail to mention that they 
were Jewish (and thus by implication "pass" as Christians). Consider, for example, Lisa Bonos’ 
discussion of Jewish families who “passed” to fit into overwhelmingly Christian largely Southern 
Baptist communities that had historically been hostile to Jews, in her review of Theodore Ross’ AM 
I A JEW: LOST TRIBES, LAPSED JEWS AND ONE MAN’S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF (2012). See Lisa 
Bonos, Op-Ed., “Am I a Jew: Lost Tribes, Lapsed Jews and One Man’s Search for Himself”, 
WASH. POST., Nov. 2, 2012,   http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/am-i-a-jew-lost-tribes-
lapsed-jews-and-one-mans-search-for-himsel-by-theodore-ross/2012/11/02/864c9fa0-07de-11e2-
858a-5311df86ab04_story.html.  Although such historical practices were undoubtedly critical to 
negotiate life in deeply anti-Semitic societies, Dershowitz for example, is disapproving of Jews 
who "pass." ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE VANISHING AMERICAN JEW: IN SEARCH OF JEWISH 
IDENTITY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1997), 
50 The black Barbadian migrant, Solomon Riley, known as Millionaire Riley, discussed below, who 
is known to have bought properties in the name of his white wife would be an exception. Yet even 
Riley’s tactic of “passing” could only have been effective in his earliest transactions. After this, he 
became widely known (and hated) for moving blacks into previously “white” properties - so 
presumably the tactic of hiding behind his wife would no longer have been effective. 
51 James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility, supra note 3.   
52 Yoshino, supra note 49.  
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underlying identity), they may nevertheless have been "covering." Those 
who engage in “covering” retain and disclose the underlying identity, “but 
make it easy for others to disattend.”53   
In an arguably related argument in “Working Identity,” Carbado and 
Gulati assert that many racial minorities “proactively work their identity to 
avoid discrimination in the first place.” 54  Notably, blacks “work” their 
identities to negotiate inter-group discrimination (for example, landlords or 
employers preferring whites over blacks). As importantly, they “work” their 
identities to negotiate intra-group discrimination (that is landlords or 
employers preferring some black people over other black people).  
We have long known that there are elements of identity that might be 
classified in the tradition of the social theorists, Goffman and Butler as 
“performative.”  The notion that some West Indian blacks “work” their 
identities to their benefit (and by extension to exclusion of other blacks, 
namely, native African Americans) is a quintessentially performative 
theory. 55   Dershowitz was making essentially an equivalent point with 
respect to “passing” Jews.  
Moreover, long before it surfaced in the civil rights scholarship, this 
point was made (with pointed candor) in real life. West Indians were well 
known for emphasizing that they were “British subjects” - a phenomenon 
that has been referred to as “performing Britishness.”56 A. Phillip Randolph, 
the civil rights leader chastised West Indians for retaining their status as 
British subjects, as opposed to naturalizing to American citizenship. 57 
Randolph’s point was implicit: West Indians were abusing the good graces 
of Americans by choosing to retain their status as British subjects, even as 
they enjoyed the benefits of long-term American residency, without taking 
on the requisite obligations of American citizenship (including civil rights 
activism).  
That is, Randolph felt that West Indians believed that they were better 
off as “British subjects” rather than as “colored” Americans. One could 
hardly find a better real-life example of a group being accused of 
performative identity. The question seems clear: were West Indians 
beneficiaries of “covering” or “working” their identities in housing as well? 
All of these paths lead to one question: how did West Indians become 
“insiders,” that is, to occupy some status sufficiently different than the 
conventional "outsider" status, to render them eligible (even informally) for 
housing, traditionally denied to persons of African descent? This is the 
puzzle that this essay seeks to engage.  Something seems not to add up . . .  
                                                     
53 Id. 
54 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).   
55 Performative theories are now most prominently associated with Goffman and Butler. ERVING 
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER 
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).  
56 Eleanor Brown, How the US Selected for a Black Bourgeosie Geo. Imm. L. J.  
57  See Daryl Scott, “Immigrant Indigestion” A Philip Randolph: Radical and Restrictionist, CTR.  
FOR IMMIGRATION STUD. (June 1999), http://cis.org/AfricanAmericanAttitudesImmigration-
AphilipRandolph. 
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II. HOW WEST INDIANS CAME TO BUY INTO WHITE NEIGHBORHOODS  
A. Prelude 1900-1920 
 
How did West Indians come to enter white neighborhoods in the first 
place? West Indians starting arriving in New York in significant numbers in 
the early 1900s.58 The early narratives of West Indian migrant life in New 
York, as told by the earliest migrants, indicate that they did not initially meet 
with significant resistance.59 Indeed some early West Indian migrants moved 
into white neighborhoods. 60  
According to Massey and Denton’s classic on residential 
segregation, American Apartheid, segregation was hardly an issue, in most 
modern cities, including New York prior to the early 1900s.61  The West 
Indian experience upon arrival in New York dovetails well with Massey and 
Denton’s historical narrative. 
 It bears emphasis that at the time that West Indians starting arriving 
in New York, the black population was miniscule (less than 3%).62 At the 
turn of the century, the number of West Indians (and indeed the number of 
African-Americans) would have been too small to occasion notice.63  It was 
only when blacks start arriving in Northern cities in large numbers that the 
institutional forces that we typically associate with segregation began to 
arise.64  These institutional forces included race-based steering by realtors, 
race-based residential advertising, and so forth.65 
 
B. 1920 onwards: Racial cartelization 
 
In the period immediately preceding 1920, there was a dramatic 
increase in the number of blacks in New York City, occasionally by a burst 
of migration of West Indians, as well as African-American migrants from 
the South. 66   Although blockbusting, as an institutional force which 
                                                     
58 James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility, supra note 3.  
59 WATKINS-OWENS, supra note 19.  
60 Id.  
61 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (Cambridge 1993) ("There was a time, before 1900, when 
.. . . blacks were more likely to share a neighborhood with whites than with other blacks.") 
62 MARY WHITE OVINGTON, HALF A MAN: THE STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN NEW YORK (1911); 
W.E.B. DUBOIS ON SOCIOLOGY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY 140-54 (Dan S. Green & Edwin D. 
Driver, eds. 1980); see also James, Explaining Afro American Social Mobility, supra note 3; ISABEL 
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 
(2011); WALLACE THURMAN, NEGRO LIFE IN NEW YORK'S HARLEM (1928).  
63 James, Explaining Afro American Social Mobility, supra note 3.  
64 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61. 
65 Id. 
66 Osofsky, supra note 43.  
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accelerates segregation,67  has been out of vogue as an academic topic for 
decades, it clearly featured prominently in New York City. Indeed, 
blockbusting appears to have been taking place in New York as early as the 
1920s.68  
By way of background, blockbusting is the deliberate facilitation of 
“racial tipping” in previously all-white or integrated neighborhoods for 
speedy transition to black neighborhoods.  Such “tipping” is typically 
facilitated by realtors (and other actors in the real estate industry) bent on 
eliciting super-commissions.69  Notably, blockbusting is an academic term 
of much later heritage than 1920s New York; blockbusting only emerges as 
a phenomenon in literature in the 1950s.70 However, in this section, I argue 
that the actions of early West Indian realtors provided a preview of 
blockbusting.  Indeed, they appropriated techniques that arguably 
approximated blockbusting and preceded their mid-century peers by 
decades.71 
Black realtors seeking to open up more housing to their black clients 
(while simultaneously making commissions), were up against significant 
institutional forces. For example, Massey and Denton discuss how 
“voluntary associations” of white citizens in Northern cities (as opposed to 
the South, which we more typically associate with institutionalized 
segregation) were extraordinarily vigilant in ensuring that their 
neighborhoods remained “whites only.”72 Every effort was made to prevent 
blacks from entering certain neighborhoods, including threatened boycotts 
of white real estate agents who cooperated with black agents, and the 
withdrawal of support from white businesses that served black customers.73 
Others went as far as "collect[ing] money to create funds to buy property 
from black settlers or to purchase homes that remained vacant for too long; 
[and] offer[ing] cash bonuses to black renters who agreed to leave the 
neighborhood."74  
 Massey and Denton’s classic is typically where scholars of 
segregation start.75 However, Massey and Denton are writing primarily of 
the 1950s and later decades. Moreover, they do not discuss New York in the 
                                                     
67 It bears emphasis: blockbusting is a term of much later heritage (circa 1950s). See Dmitri 
Melhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145 (1998).  
68 See New York Times articles, infra note 170. 
69 Blockbusting came to widespread public attention through a widely read article in the Saturday 
Evening Post. Following the public outcry that accompanied this article, there were a range of 
federal, state and municipal initiatives to prevent blockbusting. Norris Vitchek, Confessions of a 
Block-Buster, SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 14, 1962. 
70MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61.  
71 Given Melhorn’s broader view of the important market roles played by blockbusters in opening 
up new housing to blacks, one might anticipate a similarly charitable assessment of their West 
Indian counterparts. See MELHORN, supra note 67. 
72 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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detail that they do Chicago.76 Osofky’s classic study of the development of 
Harlem is helpful in this regard.77 While to modern minds, Harlem is known 
as an iconic black community (the “capital of black America”), it was 
originally white.78 Moreover, it was one of the first communities in which 
West Indians settled.79 Osofky makes clear that the techniques discussed by 
Massey and Denton in mid-century Chicago, were also utilized by whites in 
Harlem to discourage black settlement.80 Moreover, they were utilized as 
early as the 1920s.81  
 Viewing racial segregation in real property ownership through the 
lens of the antitrust literature,” Roithmayr deems white neighbourhood 
associations “racial cartels.”82 What is a racial cartel?83 Cooter analogizes 
racial cartels to conventional cartels noting that “[j]ust as producers collude 
to fix prices and obtain monopoly profits, so [racial cartels] collude to obtain 
the advantages of a monopoly control over markets.”84  
One such market is the real estate market.  Appropriating Cooter’s 
terminology, Roithmayr argues that a segregated residential community is a 
classic example of a racial monopoly. 85  Alongside homeowner’s 
associations, Roithmayr argues that real estate boards, as well as collectives 
of white real estate agents, were quintessential examples of “cartel”-type 
organizations.86  
These organizations played a critical role in policing racial 
covenants, typically noted on deeds, which prevented white homeowners 
from selling to blacks. And it bears emphasizing that racial covenants were 
perhaps the most genial of many pernicious methods utilized to exclude 
blacks.  In New York, as in Chicago, such techniques included boycotts of 
white real estate agents who cooperated with black real estate agents.   
 Racial covenants were of course, classic tools of anti-competitive 
behavior – they served an important role in curtailing black access to 
property in certain neighbourhoods. If the neighbourhood associations 
discussed by Denton and Massey in mid-century Chicago were racial cartels, 
there is little doubt that similar associations in Harlem in the 1920s merit a 
similar label.  
                                                     
76 Id. 
77 OSOFSKY, supra note 43 (exploring the history of the black community of New York City in the 
late 19th and early 20th Centuries). 
78 E. Franklin Frazier, Negro Harlem: An Ecological Study, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
el 
79 OSOFSKY, supra note 43; see also New York Times articles, infra note 170.  
80 OSOFSKY, supra note 43. 
81 Id. 
82  Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010).  
83 Id. 
84 Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 150 (1994) (“Just as 
producers collude to fix prices and obtain monopoly profits, so [racial cartels] collude to obtain the 
advantages of a monopoly control over markets”).  
85 Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 
727 (2000) [hereinafter Roithmayer, Barriers to Entry”] (arguing that market lock-in supplies the 
argument of market failure).  
86 Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, supra note 83.  
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  Roithmayr goes further arguing that “early neighbourhood 
advantage” secured by racial cartels, has now become “locked-in.” 87 
Utilizing analogies from the antitrust literature, she notes if a firm’s anti-
competitive conduct occurs early enough in the development of an industry, 
this conduct may provide the firm with such a significant advantage that 
other competitors find it virtually impossible to catch up. 88 In other words, 
“the ‘early-mover’ advantage . . . can become self-reinforcing over time” so 
much so that economists refer to the early mover advantage as being “locked-
in.” 89  For example, Microsoft’s oft-cited success with the Windows 
operating system (to the exclusion of other operating systems) illustrates a 
classic example of institutional “lock in.” 90  
 Similarly, Roithmayr argues that early neighbourhood advantage 
becomes “locked in” through “self-reinforcing neighbourhood effects.” 91 
These include job-referral networks (which are heavily neighbourhood-
based) and mechanisms of financing public schools (in which better off 
neighborhoods receive better public financing given their deeper property 
tax base). 92 Even if the language of antitrust seems strange when utilized in 
this context, the sociological literature provides significant support for 
Roithmayr’s thesis. If Roithmayr is right, whether or not blacks are 
successful in “breaking” racial cartels early may have long-term implications 
for whether they access critical networks needed to improve their economic 
prospects.   
Hence the assumption which is implicit in the literature (namely that 
West Indians and African Americans were in the same boat with respect to 
residential segregation in New York) needs to be called into question.  While 
there may have been early institutional similarities with respect to how 
residential segregation operated against West Indians and African 
Americans, the institutional differences are potentially significant. The early 
clue of a critical difference between the two groups is what the sociological 
literature clearly substantiates – namely that West Indians were able to 
access owner-occupied middle class white neighborhoods, earlier and in 
larger numbers.  
Indeed, if we follow through the implications of Roithmayr’s thesis, 
the critical difference between early African-American migrants and early 
West Indian migrants to New York City may be the extent to which early 
racial cartels in housing constrain their long-term opportunity sets. Thus, 
while institutional exclusion may have been “locked in” in relation to 
African Americans, this may not be true (or may be less true) of West Indian 
Americans.  My thesis is that West Indian Americans were at least partially 
                                                     
87 Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197 (2004). 
88 Id at 202.  
89 Id.  
90 Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 88 at 202, 206.  
91 Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 88.  
92 Id.  
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successful in busting the racial cartels which characterized segregated 
neighborhoods – the subject of the next section.   
 
C.  White defection 
 
The long-term success of any cartel is at least partly dependent on 
its ability to prevent defection among its members.93 To prevent defection, 
cartel members typically threaten each other with severe retaliation. 94 
Moreover, the threats have to be not only severe, they also have to be 
credible. 95 Thus, it is unsurprising that the primary techniques (detailed by 
Denton and Massey and later deployed by Roithmayr to support her racial 
monopoly model) are focused on the prevention of white defection.96 
 If the prevailing norm was one of racial exclusivity in housing, the 
key was to prevent whites from deviating from this norm.97 If they did not 
sell, there would be no homes for blacks to buy. White voluntary associations 
realized that the key to keeping neighborhoods all white was pinpointing 
whites who were at risk of defection.  
Thus, it is not coincidental that a series of articles in the New York 
Times (contemporaneous with the initial black entries into white 
neighborhoods) discuss efforts to publicly “shame” whites who sold property 
to blacks, and intermediaries involved in the transactions (such as white real 
estate agents) -- not unlike the methods detailed in the Massey and Denton 
extract above. 98  The point was clearly to drive home that the costs of 
defection (including but not limited to reputational costs), would be 
significant.  One can hardly imagine that it was good for business to be 
publicly shamed. 
A return to Brooks and Rose is in order. Brooks and Rose begin the 
book by underlining the persistence of such covenants well into the second 
half of the twentieth century. 99  One need only consider the deeply 
controversial revelation during Justice Rehnquist’s nomination hearings (for 
the position of Chief Justice) that he held property with a racially restrictive 
covenant, 100 long after Shelly v. Kraemer, the landmark case that held that 
such covenants were unenforceable.101 Brooks and Rose address the puzzle 
of the persistence of such covenants, even after Shelly v. Kraemer.102   
                                                     
93 GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 192-200 (5th ed. 2004): 
EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (2011); KEITH HYLTON; 
ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION (2003).   
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 61; Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 88.  
97 Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 88.  
98 See New York Times Articles,  infra note 170.  
99 BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 27.  
100 Id.  
101 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
102 BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 27. 
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Drawing on the law and social norms literature, their thesis is that 
the existence of such covenants is less about their enforceability than about 
their value in “signalling” norms. 103  These covenants signal to racial 
“insiders” that they can rest assured that only fellow insiders are welcome in 
the neighborhood. 104 Similarly, they signal to outsiders that they need not 
apply.105 The mere “signal” had significant value in accomplishing policy 
goals that may now seem anachronistic such as the preservation of property 
values (even at the significant cost of black exclusion) and the reduction in 
social tension (which was thought to be more likely if blacks and whites were 
not living together).106  
Potential defectors should typically conduct a cost-benefit analysis: 
will I gain more from the short-term defection than I gain from long-term 
participation in the cartel?107 Thus, the key to eliciting defection from the 
aforementioned norms is to raise the benefits from short-term defection. A 
prospective seller who believes that she can get cash (a lot of it, and up front) 
will perhaps convince herself that she can move into a nicer neighborhood.   
For this reason, it is unsurprising that accounts of the time accuse 
both white agents (and by extension black agents acting in concert with 
them) of taking advantage of an atmosphere of racial panic to make 
extraordinary commissions for themselves.108 The returns for their clients 
(certainly the earliest defectors) would have had to have been similarly 
impressive. This would be particularly true in relation to whites who sold 
later and presumably for less, given that the entry of blacks typically lowered 
real estate values.109  
There are of course, at least two ways of looking at this: one could 
characterize a West Indian broker (acting in concert with a white broker, 
since blacks could not represent whites) as taking “advantage” of “racial 
panic.” Or one could simply look at it as West Indian realtors expanding 
market access for their clients who were facing a paltry, substandard, and 
overpriced “black” housing stock.   
 But, the fact remains that irrespective of the moral lens through 
which one views such transactions, no West Indian broker would be in a 
position to take advantage of "racial panic" without cash. West Indians were 
well placed to elicit defections because they had cash. I believe that my claim 
is a modest one. What distinguished West Indians from their peers in the 
black realtor sector (and from African Americans more generally) was that 
they had cash;110 they dominated the black realtor sector because they stood 
                                                     
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See GELLHORN, supra note 93.  
108 See infra note 170.  
109 This is well explained in MELHORN, supra note 67.  
110 See Calvin Holder, Making Ends Meet: West Indian Economic Adjustment in New York City, 
1900–1952, 1 WADABAGEI 31, 55–60 (1998) (documenting West Indian representation among 
realtors, credit providers for home purchase, and insurance companies). 
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out for their relatively liquidity (and for the liquidity of their clients).111 
Cash-rich blacks were still virtually unheard of at the time.112  
This is why I believe that my claim is modest – West Indians were 
able to elicit defections, simply because they had cash. Notably, they had 
cash because they arrived from the West Indies having long been owners of 
real-property in their home countries.113 Also importantly, they had cash 
because binding rules undergirded their transactions and rules facilitated the 
availability of liquidity.114  
West Indians buyers were more likely to be able to access informal 
credit that allowed them to generate cash when needed.115 That is, even when 
they did not have immediate cash, they had access to informal mortgage 
financing.116 A seller should be indifferent if a buyer needs a mortgage, as 
long as the mortgage closes sufficiently quickly to produce cash in short 
order.  Notably, West Indians had such access to mortgage financing (first 
                                                     
111 For a description of the liquidity of West Indian players in real estate, see Eleanor Brown, The 
Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory of Black West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27, 50.   
112 There is a plethora of writing on the institutional challenges to building net-worth among African 
Americans, both historically and in contemporary times. For summaries of statistical comparative 
net worth data between blacks and whites, particularly in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis, please 
see  Paul Taylor et al., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN 
WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-
blacks-hispanics/; see also Thomas M. Shapiro et al., The Racial Wealth Gap Increases Fourfold, 
BRANDEIS UNIV., INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POLICY, RESEARCH AND POLICY BRIEF (2010); 
WILHELMINA LEIGH ET AL., Asset Building in Low-Income Communities of Color: Predisposing 
Factors and Promising Practices in States Effective at Building Assets for Low Income Residents, 
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barriers to land ownership particularly in the Jim Crow South (with clear implications for later real 
property ownership in the North)  is by Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to 
Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community 
Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 517-23 (2001). Other 
articles in the legal scholarship in this area include, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, African-American Freedom 
in Antebellum Cumberland County, Virginia, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 927 (1995); Thomas W. 
Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A Critical Role for Legal 
Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 557 (2005); Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced Sale Risk: Class, 
Race, and the “Double Discount”, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589 (2010). Articles addressing the asset 
acquisition implications of more recent discrimination include Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It 
Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005); Anthony 
J. Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of the Global Economy, 44 DUKE L.J. 928 (1995); A. Brooke 
Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995); Keith 
N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric 
Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 (1996); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, 
Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369 (2011). Other articles outside the legal scholarship 
include THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER—ENDANGERED SPECIES (Leo McGee & Robert Boone 
eds., 1979);  see also Mark R. Schulte, The Dream Realized?: African American Landownership in 
Central Georgia Between Reconstruction and World War Two, 72 AGRIC. HIST. 298, 307 (1998). 
113 See Brown, supra note 111.  
114 Id. 
115 Id at 52-53.  
116 Id. 
   
 
20 
 
informally and then formally) long before such financing formally existed – 
particularly for blacks.117  
Agents and developers who buy on behalf of clients with cash have more 
leverage – they can buy more confidently and elicit better terms.   The 
efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in their islands of 
origin was undergirded by a set of rules, namely rules which solved 
collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in trust on 
behalf of other West Indians, secure in the knowledge that the cash would be 
found. 118  Rules also protected future land-owners from unscrupulous 
trustees. 119  
Similarly brokers in New York had significant opportunities for 
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their 
fellow West Indians, because such behavior would have entailed communal 
expulsion. Thus patterns from the West Indies replicate themselves in New 
York. 
 
D. Anecdotal evidence to support this theory: What we know from the 
historical sources 
 
Modern studies clearly state that West Indians are more likely to occupy 
higher quality housing either as homeowners or renters than African 
Americans. 120  Moreover, they are more likely to live in integrated 
communities. 121  
The question becomes: How far back does this evidence go? How do we 
know that West Indians were better placed (in relation to African Americans) 
with respect to property rental and acquisition? It bears emphasis that there 
is virtually no empirical work on comparative housing stock between West 
Indians and African-Americans in the first half of the twentieth century, even 
as they were both began migrating to New York in significant numbers at 
about the same time.
122
 However, we can piece together from other historical 
sources ample evidence that West Indians were more likely to live in 
majority white communities or mixed black-white communities. 123 
Moreover, these same sources support the view that West Indians have had 
                                                     
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 ROSENBAUM & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1. 
121 Id. 
 122  I should further note the controversial implication is that West Indians are useful as a 
comparative “sample” since West Indians were arriving in Northern cities in significant numbers 
at around the same time that significant numbers of African Americans were migrating from the 
South.  
123 WATKINS-OWENS, supra note 19;  Holder, supra note 110; see also New York Times articles, 
infra note 170.   
   
 
21 
 
better access to housing, and were also able to occupy higher quality housing 
in the early 20th century than African-Americans. 124   
Extrapolating from this early evidence to modern demographic studies, 
one study goes as far as to contend that despite being black West Indian, 
New Yorkers had a pattern of ascent in the housing market that is most 
appropriately described as “ethnic.”125 Thus, in the housing market, West 
Indians are more appropriately analogized perhaps to Italian, Irish or Jewish 
New Yorkers than to African Americans.126   
While made specifically in the context of the housing market, this 
argument seems to channel the sociologists, Moynihan and Glazer’s well-
known contention that although they were overwhelmingly black, West 
Indians’ pattern of socioeconomic ascent in New York, was not unlike that 
of “white ethnics.”127  Yet another historian has argued that that despite being 
Black, West Indian New Yorkers have historically exercised what he terms 
an “ethnic option” (typically available to white ethnics), not available to 
native African Americans of choosing housing accommodations in higher-
quality neighborhoods.128 
Despite the absence of empirical work on comparative housing stock 
between African-Americans and West Indians in the early 20th century, this 
is a literature to be reckoned with. 129 Indeed, the sources utilized to justify 
these contentions are voluminous, not unlike those typically used by 
historians of black life at the time, including, journalistic accounts (New 
York had a very vibrant black press from early in the 20th century), and 
personal diaries. 130 In the absence of empirical evidence, I must rely instead 
on a narrative-based methodology (an admitted limitation based on the 
evidence of the period). 
From this literature, we know the following. West Indians dominated the 
black realtor market starting early in the Twentieth Century. 131 By way of 
background, in a segregated housing market, the realtor businesses were 
similarly segmented. 132 Thus, there existed a white realtor segment and a 
black realtor segment. 133    
Black realtors were particularly important players in a period of rapid 
black migration (of African-Americans from the South and of West Indians 
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from the islands), which led to a significant demand for housing among 
blacks.134 Given the racial segmentation of the real estate market, high levels 
of black demand for property put upward pressure on prices in black 
communities. As the black “middle men,” West Indian realtors acted as “go-
betweens” between blacks seeking to sell to other blacks, but also as go-
betweens between white homeowners and black buyers.135  
In one sense, the emphasis of West Indian success in the real estate 
sector in the literature was not atypical; the West Indian dominance of 
business has long been the subject of significant sociological inquiry. Indeed, 
the iconic West Indian businessman first came to prominence in the literature 
a century ago during the Harlem Renaissance136 and nowhere was the West 
Indian influence in business more comprehensive than in real estate. Yet it 
still bears emphasis that the presence of a core of West Indian real estate 
agents in the early 1900s was remarkable as this was a profession in which 
racial minorities and women were notoriously poorly represented until quite 
recently.137  The most successful realtors were those who were able to take 
advantage of the aforementioned defectors from the norms of racial 
exclusivity, as was discussed in the previous section.138  In the next section, 
I discuss a case study of one particular West Indian realtor who was able to 
do this particularly successfully.  
E.  Tipping 
 
A series of articles in prominent papers like the New York Times, detail 
several streets in which whites and blacks were living in close proximity in 
the first two decades of the Twentieth century, primarily, in the more elite 
                                                     
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 See Calvin B. Holder, Making Ends Meet, supra note 112 at 52–54 (1998) (noting the relative 
entrepreneurial success of West Indian Blacks after 1920 as compared to other Blacks in America);  
George Edmund Haynes, The Negro at Work in New York City: A Study in Economic Progress 101, 
108 (Apr. 1, 1912) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the New 
York University Law Review) (documenting the disproportionate share of West Indian business 
proprietors in 1909 in relation to their proportion in the Black population); It was clearly 
documented in the 1930s that West Indians were disproportionately represented among Black 
professionals in New York City. See Holder, Making Ends Meet, supra note 112 at 53–54 (1998) 
(“By the 1930s, . . . West Indians were clearly the majority of black businesspersons in New York 
and were, for all intents and purposes, the only blacks with businesses connected to the skilled 
trades.”); John C. Walter, The Caribbean Immigrant Impulse in American Life: 1900–1930, 11 
REVISTA INTERAMERICANA 522, 529–30 (1981). James offers a comprehensive critique of the 
notion that West Indians are “exceptional.” See James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility, 
supra note 3 at 241 (claiming that selective migration and previously acquired skills influenced the 
advancement of West Indians in the United States, and using data to “remove the aura of magic and 
mystery from their trajectory in the United States”). 
137 There is not much academic work in this area, but it is telling that for example, the New Haven 
Real Estate Board had virtually no female and black members in the 1950s. See Stuart H. Palmer, 
The Role of the Real Estate Agent in the Structuring of Residential Areas A Study in Social Control 
49 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Yale University 
Library). 
138 Id.  
   
 
23 
 
sections of Harlem like Sugar Hill. 139 Notably, many of the blacks discussed 
in these articles were owners rather than renters.  These blacks were 
overwhelmingly West Indians who had come from the islands with cash 
reserves, few native African Americans were in a position to rent (much less 
own) homes in these areas at this time.140  
While these communities co-existed with a few blacks, white flight 
quickly ensued once blacks began to move in significant numbers into the 
larger Harlem community (as opposed to its most elite sections).141  Heeding 
the call of the African American “father of Harlem”, the realtor Phillip 
Payton, that it was possible to “make money from racism,” 142  the well-
known Barbadian millionaire speculator, Solomon Riley began a pattern of 
behavior that bears a resemblance to what later became known as 
“blockbusting.” 143  
  Riley’s narrative is of particular interest. Long a millionaire, he resided 
on a very tiny Harlem street alongside whites.144 At first his tenure was 
peacable, but when other blacks began to express an interest in the area, his 
neighbors expressed increasing displeasure at his presence in the 
neighborhood.145 Previously, he believed that he had been protected by the 
widespread disbelief among whites that there were other blacks rich enough 
to move into the more affluent sections of Harlem.146  To add insult to injury, 
his wife was white at a time when inter-racial marriage still met with 
widespread societal disapproval. 147  
 Riley later told his tale to a New-Deal era Works Progress 
administration researcher, who was conducting federally funded research on 
the history of Harlem. 148 Given increasing expressions of hostility from his 
neighbors, he moved. 149  In an effort to extract revenge on his bigoted 
neighbors, he then deliberately sought a black family to whom he could lease 
the property. 150 Having sought to eject one black family, he wanted to make 
the point that they would simply find themselves with another. 151  
 Athough Riley argues that he was simply motivated by revenge, it is 
worth mentioning that his actions might have been motivated by economic 
self-interest. By way of background, as more blacks moved to New York, 
and white communities reacted with hostility by “penning” blacks into 
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particular areas, housing became difficult to secure for blacks generally.152 
Notably, this was increasingly true even for affluent blacks.153 Thus, Riley 
could surely have extracted a premium from a black tenant (that he would 
not necessarily have been able to extract from a white tenant). Given the 
black housing shortage in a racially segregated market, the opportunities for 
arbitrage were significant.154  
 Riley’s narrative continues: his white neighbor, panicking at the 
evidence of yet another  black family with the resources needed to move into 
the neighbood, decided that he would no longer stay and moved at short 
notice.155 Riley, by his account, did nothing to disabuse his former neighbor 
of the notion of a pending black onslaught (one cannot help wondering 
whether he helped feed the panic).156   
Sensing an opportunity, he bought his neighbors home at a discount. In 
an effort to increase the likelihood that his former neighbors would sell, his 
wife conducted transactions on his behalf and he often bought properties in 
her name. 157   He then moved yet another black family into his former 
neighbor’s home as tenants.158 And then another neighbour moved.159 And 
so he found himself building quite an asset base by acquiring tiny 
townhouses at significant discounts as panicked whites moved in a hurry.160 
Notably, since there remained so few places for blacks generally to rent (and 
particularly so few elite places), he remained able to charge premium rents 
for his newly aquired townhouses.161  
Features of this story stand out. First, Riley was in the neighborhood in 
the first place because he had the cash. If his account is credible, his early 
acceptance by his neighbors seemed based on their perceptions that few 
blacks would be in a position to buy the property.   
Moreover typically in a racially segregated housing and realtor market, 
tipping would require the cooperation of both black and white agents – white 
agents to service the families moving out and black agents to provide service 
to the families moving in.162  
Yet as Riley tells the story, he was not acting in concert with white 
agents to “tip” the neighborhood. 163  On the contrary, he was a 
homeowner. 164   Neighbors created a hostile environment which led his 
family to exit the neighborhood, and his neighbors got their “just deserts” 
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when black tenants moved in. 165 Indeed, he could quite reasonably have 
argued that they should have reasonably forseeen that the future tenants 
would be black. 166 That is, given the racial temper of the period, one could 
not reasonably have expected whites to rent from a black man.167   
Although the fact that his wife often conducted transactions on his 
behalf probably helped, this could hardly have remained a secret for long.168  
While hiding behind his wife could be construed as “passing,” (or if not, 
“covering”) the success of “passing” as a strategy is inextricably intertwined 
with ignorance of the black identity of the ultimate buyer. It is unclear that 
“passing” would have worked in the long term given the notoreity that 
ultimately accompanied Riley’s acquitions. 
But it bears emphasis that Riley could quite reasonably have provided 
a self-interested account. Riley might well have been involved in deliberately 
eliciting racial tipping.  Given the opportunities for arbitrage, it is perhaps 
inevitable that agents would begin to act as Riley did. Moreover,  as a simple 
matter of business efficiency, it is eminently understandable that  Riley could 
justify his behavior as simply satisfying the preferences of his black clients 
who preferred to live with blacks. 169 
For example, one account of the period from the New York Times 
suggests that white and black players were acting in concert to “tip” 
neighborhoods.170  One owner of several buildings in Harlem, Mr. Meyer 
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was cited as an owner who appeared to be acting in concert with black 
realtors. (Given the racial temper of the time period, one cannot help 
wondering whether anti-Semitism underlies the New York Times focus on 
Mr. Meyer). 171  Mr. Meyer was accused of notifying white tenants that they 
would have to vacate, shortly before selling to cash-rich blacks (represented 
by black realtors). These black buyers would then quickly fill the building 
with black tenants.172   
Moreover, Mr. Meyer was accused of heaping further indignities on his 
former white tenants, some of whom were unable to secure replacement 
housing given the short notice. 173 These whites found themselves having to 
negotiate for lease extensions with the new black owners through their black 
agents who were largely West Indians. 174 The New York Times notes that 
the indignity was even further compounded by the fact that blacks began to 
move into their buildings very shortly after the buildings were transferred to 
black owners -- thus white (former) tenants found themselves living 
temporarily beside black (new) tenants.  
While other West Indians in the property business did not provide such 
rich historical accounts as Riley, the historian, Watkins-Owens  notes that it 
is likely similar strategies were utilized by Adolph Howell, a West Indian 
principal in the Sphinx Realty Company, and William Roach, a 
phenomenally successful Montesseratan who was principal in the Sarco 
Realty Company.175 That is, having bought low from fleeing whites, they 
sold or leased high to blacks who were desperaate for decent real estate.  
Notably, Sarco was dominant not only in residential housing in Harlem but 
also owned several presitgious commercial addresses in Harlem. 
 It is not that these “tipping” patterns were exclusive to West Indians. 
Indeed, African Americans realtors undoubtedly replicated similar patterns, 
and in fact preceded their West Indian peers. Yet while African American 
realtors, such as Phillip Payton and John Nail, first opened Harlem in the first 
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decade of the Twentieth Century, few of their companies lasted.176 This is 
unsurprising – indeed, many white realty companies were unable able to 
survive the extended downturn of the Great Depression.  West Indian realtors 
were often not only brokers, but also real estate developers. Given the poor 
availabilty of credit generally at the time (and particularly for black 
businessmen), many of the West Indian purchases were cash purchases. All 
this is to say that although some of the West Indian broker/developers failed 
during the Great Depression, they appear to have had deeper reserves, and 
longer staying power thant their African American peers in this difficult 
period.  
A pattern of West Indian dominance of Black access to segregated 
housing markets through their control of the realty business appears to have 
been present throughout New York. Their influence extended outside of 
Harlem. In Brooklyn, for example, the Carringtons were prominent Black 
players in residential real estate.
177 Fellow West Indians were believed to 
have privileged access to homes that the Carringtons controlled. 
 
F. Related factors that allowed West Indians to quickly consolidate 
their gains 
 
There were related factors that allowed West Indians to quickly 
consolidate their gains in these neighborhoods. For example, there appear to 
have been integration across housing-related businesses, so that West Indian 
advantages in one line of business carried over to another. For instance, the 
Paragon Credit Union, which provided mortgage support to Brooklyn-based 
West Indians (especially Barbadians), received referrals primarily from the 
Carrington brothers.
178  The same referral process appears to have been 
important to the West Indian–founded Victory Insurance Company, which 
provided insurance for West Indian–owned homes and businesses.
179  In 
addition, Watkins-Owens documents a plethora of far smaller but highly 
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influential West Indian real estate market participants.
180 For example, there 
were hundreds of operators of boarding houses who provided West Indian 
renters with an early foothold in neighborhoods where they would later 
become homeowners.
181
 This was arguably the genesis of the West Indian 
advantage in home ownership.
182
 
 
 
III. ANALOGIES TO WEST INDIAN HISTORY 
 
A. Map of this section 
 
By way of background, in the early decades of the 20th Century when 
West Indians started arriving in New York, homeownership in the US was 
largely limited to whites with resources.183 Blacks (although their numbers 
were miniscule) and poorer whites were essentially excluded from home-
ownership. 184   Homeownership did not become more broadly based until 
federal government intervention in the home mortgage market decades 
later.185 Even later, when poorer whites gained access to federal financing 
for home mortgages, blacks were typically excluded from such programs.186  
This section summarizes how they were able to sidestep such exclusions – 
their initial success in busting such cartels was critical. 
In this section, I also provide further evidence for the argument that with 
respect to residential segregation in the early decades of the Twentieth 
Century, West Indians are not necessarily an appropriate comparative group 
to African Americans. Notably, West Indians had multiple tools at their 
disposal (borne of their experience and capital gained in the West Indies) in 
“busting” racial cartels in real property. 187 That is, tools that worked well in 
the West Indies translated well to New York.  
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Indeed, there are repeated instances of West Indians "busting" white 
(British) monopolies in land-ownership, throughout the British West Indian 
colonies in contravention of racial norms of who was allowed to own land 
where. 188  Applying Hirschman's classic framework of "voice," "exit," and 
"loyalty,"189 I note that in the aftermath of the abolition of slavery, former 
West Indian slaves were given a "choice" of remaining on sugar plantations 
in relationships that approximated sharecropping (“loyalty”) as opposed to 
leaving the plantations (“exit”). 190   
Of course, this was never really meant by the plantocracy to be a 
“choice” for newly freed blacks. 191 Rather, the plantocracy was seeking to 
institute a system of tenancy rent (that is, sharecropping) as a mechanism of 
reducing cash outflows from their sugar plantations. Under this system, 
planter would “lease” the land to the newly freed slave in return for a share 
of the crops on the land (or some other in-kind rental payment). 192 
Emancipation greatly increased the “cash crunch” faced by planters. Indeed, 
cash outflows from plantations would necessarily have increased given the 
now-free labor (previously unfree slave labor) who needed to be paid. 193 
Tenancy rent provided a mechanism of reducing cash outflows for credit-
constrained farmers. 194   
To this end, the plantocracy, utilized every mechanism at their disposal 
to prevent newly freed West Indians from buying land. 195 After all, freedmen 
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who were already land-owners were unlikely to sign up for sharecropping. 
196   That is, the plantocracy sought to maintain a racial cartel in land-
ownership.  
Yet, West Indians overwhelmingly chose "exit." 197  They were 
facilitated in large part by self-interested white defectors, who were seeking 
to “cash” out their plantations and were willing to transgress norms of racial 
exclusivity to achieve these ends. 198  They were also facilitated by the 
development of a black land-brokering class, who acted as trustees for black 
buyers, pooled cash, identified white defectors and acted as go-betweens for 
planters willing to sell and freedmen with cash. 199   
 
B. The Prelude: Property during Slavery 
 
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonies and the West 
Indies (as British colonies) had similar historical trajectories.200 There is 
good reason for the focus of historians on the West Indies, despite its small 
size – it was in the West Indies that plantation slavery was “perfected” (to 
use the words of Ulrich Phillips, the early historian of the U.S. South) before 
it was “exported” to other colonies (such as the then British-colonized 
Carolinas). 201  It was precisely this point that Ulrich Phillips, the early 
American historian of the U.S. South, emphasized: 
 
As regards negro slavery the history of the West Indies is 
inseparable from that of North America. In them the 
plantation system originated and reached its greatest scale, 
and from them the institution of slavery was extended to the 
continent. The industrial system on the islands, and 
particularly on those occupied by the British, is accordingly 
instructive as an introduction and a parallel to the 
continental regime.202 
                                                     
196 Id. 
197 Id.  
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 See RODERICK A. MCDONALD, THE ECONOMY AND MATERIAL CULTURE OF SLAVES: GOODS 
AND CHATTELS ON THE SUGAR PLANTATIONS OF JAMAICA AND LOUISIANA (1993) (conducting a 
comparative study of slavery in the West Indies and in parts of the American South). 
201 The classics in this area are too numerous to mention in a brief footnote. For a good introduction 
to the literature in the area, you can hardly do better than THE SLAVERY READER (Gad Heuman & 
, James Walvin eds., Routledge 2003), which has an extensive introduction to plantation slavery as 
an institution, particularly in the West Indies.  
202 ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT 
AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION RÉGIME 46 (1918). As the 
historian Betty Wood establishes, most early African slaves who were imported into the English 
colonies (that later became the United States) came from the West Indies. Prior to the early 1700s, 
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Africans were sold in the West Indies. One of the early large-scale importations of African slaves 
in the American colonies occurred when Barbadian planters—who played a significant role in the 
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Whatever early institutional similarities there may have been between 
the plantation systems in the West Indies and the U.S. South, the institutional 
differences between the West Indies and the U.S. South will be clear to many 
readers, even as I do not typically make overt comparisons to plantation 
slavery in the U.S.   The two critical features of the West Indies were first, 
its relative isolation and second, the precarious nature of shipping routes (on 
which planters were initially dependent to import food to feed slaves). 
203  
 These features of the West Indies ultimately became critical to the 
evolution of property arrangements among the slave ancestors of West 
Indian property owners who later migrated to the United States. Another 
relevant feature of the West Indies was its economic importance to the 
Exchequer (British Treasury). Indeed, Jamaica at the peak of its productivity 
in the eighteenth century was among the most valuable colonies, worth 
significantly more than all of the New England colonies combined.
204   
 In my view, these features of the political economy of the West 
Indies provided incentives for the plantocracy to innovate in property and 
contracting arrangements with respect to the slave population. 205  Their 
important task was to get the slaves to feed themselves. To achieve this goal, 
importantly they had the support of the British Parliament.  Thus, critical 
interests were aligned in achieving this goal: Parliament, the   plantocracy, 
plantation financiers and the slave population (which far outnumbered the 
British population).  
 If the slaves could feed themselves, there would be less of a stress 
on precious plantation working capital (no cash outlays needed to import 
expensive food from London utilizing precarious shipping routes), 
Parliament would not need to entertain pained reports from the colonies 
about how slave malnutrition was compromising plantation productivity, and 
                                                     
founding of South Carolina in 1670—imported slaves from Barbados. See BETTY WOOD, THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 64–65 (1997) (discussing the connection between the 
Lowcountry, as the English called present-day South Carolina, and settlers from Barbados). 
203
 The historian Selwyn Carrington is a particularly strong proponent of the influence of war, 
which has been disputed by other historians and summarized neatly in Veront Satchell, Sugar 
Slavery and Technological Change: Jamaica 1760-1830 (2010) (noting Carrington’s argument that 
the American Revolutionary War prompted the decline of the British West Indies as “Caribbean 
sugar producers were extremely dependent on British North America for all commodities necessary 
for them to produce sugar”).  
 204  The islands, and particularly Jamaica, had become important to the economic wellbeing of 
the British Empire as a major source of revenue for the British Treasury, which levied ample taxes 
on the planters’ profits. See PHILIP SHERLOCK & HAZEL BENNETT, THE STORY OF THE JAMAICAN 
PEOPLE  at 281–82 (S1998) (discussing the high customs duties on consumer goods).  As an 
epicenter of sugar exportation and slave importation in the British empire, Jamaica had long been 
a regional shipping center. See SELWYN H.H. CARRINGTON, THE BRITISH WEST INDIES DURING 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 32–33 (Brill 1998) (noting that as early as the American Revolution, 
Jamaica’s exports to Britain exceeded those of the far larger American colonies that would become 
the United States); SIDNEY W. MINTZ, CARIBBEAN TRANSFORMATIONS 60 (2d ed. 1989) 
(summarizing Phillip Curtin’s finding that only Saint Domingue (later Haiti) and Brazil, far larger 
countries, imported larger number of slaves than Jamaica in the region). 
205 See infra Part III.  
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the Treasury’s coffers could continue to rely on plantation taxes. 206  
Financiers could rest easier knowing that it was more likely that planters 
would pay their debts.  Moreover, the slaves were eager for a system that 
would keep them better fed. 207 
As economists have long told us, secure entitlements incentivize 
effort; commerce increases the payoff from effort even more. 208  The 
plantocracy implicitly understood this with respect to local food production; 
they supported informal slave entitlements in plots to grow food and the 
produce that came from these plots. 209 These plots came to be known as 
“provision grounds”, and the rights that surrounded them looked very much 
like formal property rights, although the regime was essentially informal. 210  
The result was the evolution of a slave culture involving increasingly 
complex forms of property arrangements – which I have termed in a separate 
paper “de facto property rights”, including inheritance-like devices. 211 These 
slaves became what I term “property holders” in waiting.212  
Demsetz’s classic paper on property rights argued that “the 
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of 
the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.” 213 
The thesis is very Demsetzian – property rights emerged for slaves (who 
were themselves property) in response to the demand for them at multiple 
levels of plantation society. 214  Moreover, not only were slaves property 
holders; slaves also were contractors, increasingly engaging in commerce; 
they became the dominant players in the food economy. 215 
  
 
 
C. Emancipation 
      The system of allocating provision lands (property-lite) to the slaves 
was widely supported at multiple levels of plantation society during 
                                                     
206 See Brown, supra note 111.  
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208 The classic in this regard is Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967) (discussing “guidance for investigating the emergence of property rights”).  For a 
discussion of the importance of this article, see Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz 
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slavery.216 Emancipation threatened to turn everything upside down.217 Once 
labor becomes free, this relationship of reciprocal obligation (which is 
fundamentally a status relationship) is completely severed. 218  Any 
contractual relationship (be it one grounded in tenancy or employment) is 
fundamentally far more tenuous for the planter than a relationship grounded 
in status.219  
     And what to do with the property which the slave occupies but the 
planter has legal title to, i.e. former provision grounds at the edge of the 
plantation?220 If the freedman continues to work for the planter, perhaps 
there is an ongoing basis for his continuing occupancy of provision grounds 
at the edge of the plantation on which he can grow food (as he had done 
during slavery under the previously described informal and innovative 
arrangements).221 In such a case, the planter has a clear justification for the 
continuing occupation of the land by the former slave -- the slave’s ongoing 
low-cost labor on the plantation can be understood as an in-kind rental 
payment. 222  Indeed, such an arrangement may even be beneficial to the 
planter’s cash-flow.223 Theoretically, just as the freedman “pays” him for the 
land through low-cost labor or a share of crops, he “pays” the freedman (in 
kind), with less of a need for a cash-outlay. 224  
     Suppose the freedman declines employment on the plantation? One can 
expect the planter to ask himself the following: Why is a (former) slave, now 
freedman, remaining on land that is formally mine if I am no longer obligated 
to provide for him? What am I getting out of it? Predictably, there was a face-
off between the planters and the newly freedmen. 
 
D. Exit, Voice, Loyalty 
    Prior to full Emancipation, there was a period in which newly freed men 
served as “apprentices” on plantations.
225 Apprenticeship was conceived as 
a mixed slave labor/free labor period to prepare for full Emancipation. 
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Although in practice many slaves continued to be treated as they had been in 
slavery, during an apprenticeship, the slave was technically to be 
compensated for work beyond the time allocated for compulsory labor.
226
 
Upon full Emancipation, the newly fully freedmen were no longer 
obligated to remain with the plantation. Thus, the options that confronted 
West Indian freedmen when they sought to exercise their newfound freedom 
are reminiscent of Albert Hirschman’s famous conceptual ultimatum 
(“voice/exit/loyalty”).227  Albert Hirschman famously argued that members 
of any human grouping (be it a nation, a business, a religious group or a 
family) have three main options when they perceive that the grouping is no 
longer beneficial to them. Similarly, the freed slaves had three options.  
First, they could remain on the plantation in an employment 
relationship largely on the planter’s terms (“loyalty”).  For example, they 
could continue to accept wages that were as a practical matter planter-
determined. Second, they could remain on the plantation but with a more 
robust set of protections. These protections would include guaranteed leave 
(particularly for the women who wanted guaranteed days off to prepare for 
weekend markets where slave-grown food was sold), assurances that they 
could reap crops planted even in the event of a later severing of the 
employment relationship and eviction, and market determined wages (which 
would theoretically be subject to some bargaining on the part of freedmen, 
particularly in those islands where labor was inclined to be short). This 
would approximate “voice.”  Those exercising “voice” could extract 
concessions for their ongoing loyalty.  
Notably, although the concessions associated with “voice” should 
theoretically have allowed them to build assets, for many slaves this was not 
enough.   For these slaves, the better option was “exit.”   Those who already 
had assets (particularly land) could actually credibly threaten to exit 
undesirable plantation relationships, and proceed to do so.  My argument is 
that across the region, exit predominated.   
 
E. Who could exit?  
 
The likelihood that slaves would exit depended largely on two 
factors – the availability of cash and the availability of land.  Certainly in the 
earliest days of Emancipation, any cash that the slaves had would have most 
                                                     
226 As described in detail: 
Apprenticeship was a half-way covenant in which the relationship between the planter 
and the worker was much the same as that between master and slave for forty and one-
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likely been accumulated during slavery. 228 The availability of cash with 
which they could buy land was in turn tied to the extensiveness of the 
provisioning system (during slavery), that allowed them to grow crops which 
they could then market, in a particular island.229   
A primary reason that the West Indies is such a wonderful place for 
a comparative study of the evolution of property regimes (in practice as 
opposed to just in law) is that there were distinct topological and size 
differences between the islands that had significant implications for land 
allocation, both during and after slavery.  It provides a wonderful (and 
admittedly informal) “natural experiment” through which to view the thesis 
offered here: that is where freedmen had options, exit predominated, with a 
corresponding “busting” of racial cartels in land-ownership. 
  For example, some colonies (Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago) were larger with more plentiful arable land.230  And even when 
planters were unwilling to give arable land to slaves, there remained more 
marginal land in close proximity to the plantations on which the slaves could 
plant.231 Other islands (Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Kitts) were much smaller. 
Planters were less inclined to be generous because every acre given to slave 
was an acre not available for sugar plantation.232 So in these islands, although 
provisioning did occur, it was more marginal, with garden “plots” as opposed 
to more fulsome lands.233 In Barbados, in particular, which is compromised 
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almost entirely of flat arable land, nearly all land was consumed by the 
plantocracy.234  
Thus, in the larger islands, the provisioning system was much more 
extensive. 235   Slaves grew more food and the food markets were more 
plentiful. There were myriad cash crops that would allow for slaves to 
accumulate assets. Moreover, since manumission was ongoing (certainly up 
to the beginning of Apprenticeship), there were real incentives to accumulate 
cash.236  The bottom line: in the larger islands like Jamaica and Guyana, 
slaves were more likely to have cash because they had been serious market 
participants for some time.237  
Thus, in sum my argument is that across the islands, one might 
envision a continuum, with “loyalty” and “voice” being more likely in the 
smaller islands and “exit” being more likely in the larger islands. The larger 
the likelihood was of “exit,” the more quickly we are likely to witness the 
busting of racial cartels in plantation ownership.  
A final point is in order: what happened with respect to property 
acquisition during slavery (when there were no formal protections) turns out 
to be singularly important. The irony is that the extensive nature of the 
provisioning system (with the extensive exposure that it provided slaves to 
informal property arrangements or a “property-lite”) made it less likely that 
ex-slaves continued to remain in the employ of the masters once they had a 
real choice.  Rather, because they had cash, they were well positioned to bust 
racial cartels in land ownership. 
As we later see in New York, the key to busting racial cartels is white 
defectors. And at first the plantocracy seemed united in their view that newly 
freedmen would not get access to additional land. Moreover, even though 
the British Parliament passed the Amelioration Act 238 which recognized 
various aspects of slaves’ legal personhood, and which contained an 
apparently generous slate of property and contract rights, slaves rightly 
understood that the prospects for enforcement were poor.  
After all, it was eminently clear that there would have been no 
Emancipation, had it been for the plantocracy.239  Emancipation had been 
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239  There are several excellent histories of Slavery Abolition Act. For good introduction, see 
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN, MORAL CAPITAL: FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH ABOLITIONISM 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2006);  WILLIAM HAGUE, WILLIAM 
   
 
37 
 
secured because of parliamentarians in Westminster who were somewhat 
removed from the weakened West Indian plantation interests.  Enforcement 
of these newfound property and contract rights was a different matter; 
enforcement was up to the Colonial Office – staffed by civil servants based 
in the West Indies (far from London) who answered (in part) to the local 
legislatures (dominated by the plantocracy). Thus, whether or not these rights 
would be enforced was an open question.240  
Moreover, setting aside questions of enforcement, even for those 
slaves who had assets, there remained questions of land availability.241 There 
were typically only two options for buying land, plantation lands and Crown 
(that is, government owned) lands. 242  The availability of plantation lands 
would of course be determined by the plantocracy. And the availability of 
Crown lands would be determined by the Colonial Office.  Here again, the 
parliamentarians in Westminster would be too far removed to help, even if 
they were so inclined. 243  
       To achieve their goal of ensuring consistent access to low-cost labor, 
in many islands the planter-controlled Colonial legislatures, introduced 
policies of restricting freedmen’s access to Crown lands by essentially 
pricing them out of the market. 244  Additionally, the Colonial Governor 
(appointed in London, but typically close to the plantocracy) was typically 
empowered to raise the reserve price of Crown lands with little notice. 245 
Thus, if planters found themselves without access to consistent low-cost 
labor, the Colonial office would simply raise the price of land such that 
freedmen were no longer able to afford land. 246 
        Simultaneously, groups of freedmen, determined to secure their own 
land, pooled their resources and banded together to locate lands to 
purchase.247  They would then appoint trusted leaders in the community to 
conduct land purchases on their behalf.248 Having located land, they were 
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empowered to purchase land in trust, and then sub-divide the land, so that 
each of the contributing freedmen would receive land according to his 
contribution to the larger pool of funds. 249 Herein was the beginning of the 
land-brokering class.  
 For the planters to tie the slaves to the plantations, they needed to 
maintain a united front. More specifically, they needed to ensure that there 
was no land for the slaves to buy. But there was no sense in a strategy of 
precluding slave access to Crown lands if there were defectors (who were 
willing to sell to slaves).  
Suffice it to say that within the plantocracy, defectors began to 
emerge. Because many of the freedmen had cash, a minority of planters 
rightly viewed the policy of restricting freedmen’s access to land as 
foolhardy. Why not cash out?  
Predictably, as we see later in New York, cracks began to appear in 
the racial monopoly in land ownership. The cash-rich trustee land-brokers 
were well positioned to close deals with defecting whites. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Rules matter, even if they are not embodied in formal law. The 
efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in their islands of 
origin was undergirded by a set of rules - namely rules, which solved 
collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in trust on 
behalf of other West Indians while protecting future land-owners from 
unscrupulous trustees. Brokers had significant opportunities for 
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their 
fellow West Indians, because such behavior would have entailed communal 
expulsion. Similar patterns are replicated when they arrive in New York 
City.  
It bears emphasis that the legal-transplant literature is not a perfect 
fit. For example, I argue that there is not much in the way of "law," namely, 
state-backed rules, that were formally transplanted from the West Indian 
context to New York. Nevertheless, West Indians brought with them a robust 
set of norms which governed how they operated in housing and land markets.  
One might think of West Indians as comparable to diaspora Chinese 
(in Indonesia, Phillipines and Malaysia to name a few countries) now famous 
in the law and development literature,
250
 or to the Maghribi Jews (in the 
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"Muslim West") for that matter. Diaspora minorities traded for decades (and 
indeed centuries), not only domestically but also transnationally. That is, 
they operated in complex capital markets, long before the development of 
formal commercial law, either domestically or transnationally.  
There were rules that governed their transnational trade. That there 
rules were informal does not undermine their long-term effectiveness across 
borders and over centuries. These rules were very much legal transplants, 
even if they were largely informal.  
One might think of West Indians as modern equivalents of Maghribi 
Jews.251 Rules from a different place and time – allowed them to bust racial 
cartels in New York – decades, indeed centuries later.  
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